Gendered Humanitarianism: Reconsidering the ethics of war by HUTCHINGS, KJ














Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally
make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For
more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk
 1
Gendered Humanitarianism: reconsidering the ethics of war 
Kimberly Hutchings 
In Christine Sylvester (ed) Experiencing War (London and New York, Routledge, 
2011): 28-41. ISBN 9780415566315. 
 
Introduction 
For some time there has been a growing literature focused on deconstructing the concept of 
the ‘human’ in the ideas of ‘human rights’ and of ‘humanitarianism’ that have played such 
a significant part, both rhetorically and practically in post-Cold War politics (Peterson 
1990, Butler 2004, Carver 2005). There has also been the growth of a major literature 
focused specifically on the rights and wrongs of military humanitarian intervention 
(Wheeler 2000, Bellamy 2006, Belloni 2007), including feminist work addressing 
humanitarian legitimations of war (Elshtain 2004, 2005; Sjoberg 2006; Denike 2008). This 
chapter draws on these literatures in order to examine the assumptions that enable ethical 
humanitarianism, philosophically and in practice, especially when it takes a violent form. 
In particular, I am interested in how assumptions about moral authority and agency 
necessary for humanitarian ethics are underpinned by gendered discriminations of the 
human. And in the implications that follow from challenging those assumptions, for 
humanitarianism in general and humanitarian war in particular, from a feminist perspective.   
Of all of the developments in international politics in the past twenty years it is 
humanitarianism (a category that increasingly encompasses a range of practices from 
emergency aid to peace-keeping and war-making) that apparently relies most clearly on a 
universal conception of the human, since it is the violation of the human as such that 
triggers the requirement for a humanitarian response. As many scholars have argued 
however, if we examine the humanitarian script we find, not a notion of the ‘human’ as 
such, but rather sets of criteria through which the simply ‘human’ are differentiated from 
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other sorts of human. In the first two sections of what follows, I will argue that this is true 
across the range of humanitarian practices, from famine relief to military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes, but that it becomes particularly stark and consequential in the case 
of military humanitarian intervention, where the script of a politics of rescue meets the 
script of just war. I will argue that the only way in which the script of military humanitarian 
intervention can be sustained is by reproducing differences between people, most reliably 
through the naturalising effects of familiar gendered narratives. These gendered narratives 
replay, and thereby embed and reinforce, understandings of moral authority and moral 
agency that permit a way of thinking about war that keeps it at a distance. On these 
accounts the ‘just warrior’ remains untouched by war, even as he makes war.  
The gendered humanitarian script poses particular problems for feminist theorists 
seeking to establish legitimate grounds for war making. In the final section of the paper, I 
turn to examine feminist engagements with the ethics of war that are premised on a 
scepticism about the sanitised relation to violence suggested by the ‘just warrior’, but that 
simultaneously remain self-consciously ‘in touch’ with collective political violence as part 
of a repertoire of possible responses to injustice. Many feminists have argued that the 
gendered presuppositions of war make feminism incompatible with any kind of ethical 
legitimation of war, however humanitarian (Carroll 1987; Ruddick, 1990). In contrast, 
theorists such as Jean Elshtain and Laura Sjoberg, from different perspectives, argue for the 
possibility (or necessity) for feminists to engage in ethical discrimination between different 
kinds of violence. Both thinkers are critical of the gendered narratives that work to leave us 
untouched by war. But they see feminist pacifists as effectively colluding with the 
humanitarian fairy story, by placing themselves as outside of, or as uncontaminated by, the 
existence of political violence. I will suggest, however, that in their opening up of ethical 
thinking to the wounds of war, there is an ever-present danger of reinventing the (gendered) 
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fairy tales through which it has traditionally been justified. The acknowledgement of 
complexity and ambiguity is always in tension with nostalgia for the moral authority and 
agency of the maximally human, and the asymmetric relation between hero, victim and 
villain. In this respect, the work of Elshtain and Sjoberg sits more or less uneasily between 
the humanitarian script and the insights of feminist ethics. 
The purpose of the following argument is not to make a case that is either for or 
against humanitarianism. In relation to humanitarianism in general, I argue that the 
category of the ‘human’ is one that is always embedded in narratives and practices that 
belie its pretensions to universality and neutrality, and that simplify and thereby distort the 
ethical stakes of humanitarian action for both ‘rescuer’ and ‘victim’. In relation to military 
humanitarian intervention I argue that for feminists in particular the ethical legitimation of 
such actions poses deep problems. Awareness of these problems does not resolve them, but 
it does point us to the need to incorporate the ethically weighty consideration of the 
practice and experience of war into our ad bellum and in bello judgments about it. 
Moreover, any serious touching of war as a practice and experience implies a need to re-
think predominant accounts of moral authority and moral agency in humanitarian ethics 
and politics. 
 
The Ethics of Humanitarianism 
Peter Singer’s article, ‘On Famine, Affluence and Morality’ (1972) exemplifies 
humanitarianism as a universal doctrine, premised on the moral significance of the 
human as such. Inspired by the famine in East Bengal, Singer made a trenchant and 
straightforward utilitarian argument as to why affluent people in the developed world 
were morally obliged to contribute to famine relief even up to the point of marginal 
utility. In doing so, Singer cut through a range of traditional moral arguments that 
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claimed that moral obligations of charity did not hold towards distant strangers, 
asserting that the unnecessary suffering and death of humans per se triggered 
obligations on all other humans to do something about it. Singer’s argument, then, 
appeared to rely solely on a universal conception of the human. On his account any 
human undergoing unnecessary suffering and death prompts the moral requirement 
for help from any other human. On examination, however, there is still a 
differentiation in Singer’s argument between the human element of the ethical relation 
who either helps or does not help and the ‘simply’ human element that requires or 
demands help. The latter is recognisable because of his or her ‘unnecessary’ (that is to 
say preventable) suffering and danger, but also because of his or her inability to help 
his or herself. This kind of ‘human’ is the residual core or what it means to be human, 
the core to which the former human, if necessary, is obliged almost to strip himself or 
herself, if he or she is to respond to their own and the other’s humanity adequately.  
In order for Singer’s argument to be persuasive, we not only have to be 
convinced by his account of the moral implications of unnecessary human suffering 
and death, but also of a relation between humans characterised by agency and power 
on the one hand and the absence of agency and power on the other. In addition to this 
there are two further assumptions implicit in the argument. First, that the origins of 
the famine are irrelevant to the morality of the situation. This is underlined in Singer’s 
famous analogy between the obligation to provide famine relief and the rescuing of a 
child from drowning in a puddle. According to Singer, refusing to give famine relief 
is the moral equivalent of leaving the child to drown because it might get your clothes 
wet. The fact that this is a child means that we do not take his or her agency seriously 
in relation to the question of how he or she got into the puddle in the first place as 
well as whether she or he has the ability to get out. Second, that the capacity to act of 
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the affluent is linked to a means that we know will work, and that will neither 
preserve the status quo nor make the famine worse. The moral authority of the 
injunction to act is grounded in a high level of certainty about efficacy of the action 
and the technical competency of the actor. 
 Singer’s argument was powerfully made, and it provoked and continues to 
provoke a range of responses in relation to the ethics of humanitarian aid. If we look 
at these arguments we find that they tend to separate into three kinds. There are those 
that share his utilitarian assumptions but argue that their implications are different, 
most notoriously in the argument that actually it would maximise the limitation of 
human suffering if the starving were allowed to die, and therefore limit unsustainable 
population growth (Hardin 1996). Secondly, there are those that essentially agree with 
his analysis but ground the moral significance of human being differently, often in a 
deontological account of fundamental human rights or human needs. In the case of the 
former argument, the starving have had their rights violated and the affluent have a 
responsibility to respond to that violation, on some accounts not solely because they 
could be prevent it but also because they are partially responsible for that violation 
(Pogge 2008). In the case of the latter the affluent have a strict obligation to do 
something about the starving, whether they have deliberately contributed to the harm 
done or not (O’Neill 1987). The third kind of argument challenges Singer’s 
universalism, deploying a range of arguments to show that the relation between the 
affluent and the starving should not be read as analogous to the child in the puddle, 
perhaps because the responsibility for the starvation historically lies elsewhere, or the 
starving have an agency which the child/ puddle analogy denies, or because the 
distance between the affluent and the starving is morally salient on contractualist or 
communitarian grounds. The impact of these arguments is not necessarily to deny the 
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‘human’ as a category altogether, but it is to suggest that the humanitarian relation 
only holds where we can be sure that the object of humanitarian help does not share 
either the capacity or responsibility of the helper. The ‘human’ in humanitarianism 
remains defined as a relationship between the fully human (knowledgeable, capable 
adult) and the residually or potentially human (ignorant, incapable child). 
 The above discussion attempts to make the point that even within the 
philosophical discussion of the ethics of humanitarianism, discrimination between 
modes of being human is essential. Humanitarianism is inherently relational and 
requires criteria for distinguishing between the human as helper and the human as 
helped. At the philosophical level this involves differentiating between degrees of 
responsibility and agency, which is in turn linked to the degree and immediacy of 
suffering and need. But of course, humanitarianism is not just an ethical position, it is 
a policy and a practice, one which, following Singer, seeks to respond to human 
suffering, simply on the grounds that it is human suffering. In putting this philosophy 
into practice, there therefore need to be ways in which human suffering as such can be 
distinguished from other kinds. The clues as to how this can be done are already there 
in the philosophical debates provoked by Singer’s article in which the humanitarian 
call is located in those humans that are neither responsible for their plight nor able to 
do anything about it, and whose situation is capable of being addressed by the actions 
of others. But how do we know who these people are?  
The answer, it would seem, is self-evident, these are the people displaced by 
the earthquake, by crop failures, by war, gathered in makeshift camps and shanty 
towns, their desperation speaks for itself. When it comes to the practical 
implementation of any humanitarian policy, however, suffering cannot just be taken 
to speak for itself, it has to be spoken for by a range of governmental and non-
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governmental agencies that articulate the plight of the suffering to the institutional and 
individual actors who are deemed to be in a position to do something about it. This 
discourse has to construct the two dimensions of the humanitarian relation through 
entrenching a series of discriminations. One such discrimination is between purely 
human suffering and other kinds of suffering, since it is only with the assurance that 
the people in question are purely human (essentially innocent and incapable) that the 
claim that this is humanitarian aid becomes legitimate. This sets up a necessary 
boundary between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ recipients. At the other end of the 
humanitarian relation, other sorts of discrimination are at work, ones that separate out 
humanitarian givers from other kinds of powerful actors, those contributing for 
humanitarian purposes as opposed to acting in their own self-interest, those that have 
perpetrated the problem as opposed to those who will resolve it, or simply those who 
have the technical know-how and resources as opposed to those who don’t.    
  The line drawn between humanitarian aid and other kinds of aid may be 
blurred by all sorts of considerations. Sometimes these relate to the causes of 
humanitarian crisis, sometimes to the length of time that the crisis has continued, the 
actions of either helper or helped, or the broader implications for the political context 
in which the humanitarian crisis unfolds. For example, if the crisis is the result of war 
(as is often the case), humanitarian aid can be seen as sustaining the conflict or 
benefiting one side or the other, perhaps including those who have done most to bring 
the crisis about. No donor wants to see their aid as a reward for violence or as the 
means by which dictators are kept in power. To count as humanitarian it needs to 
relate to the human as such, to be moral rather than political. Given that no situation 
of humanitarian crisis is without these kinds of complexities, humanitarian agencies 
need a language of humanitarianism through which they can link the objects of their 
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help to a residual (and unthreatening) humanity (Singer’s child), and the helpers to a 
fully-fledged, powerful conception of humanity (Singer’s adult). One of the most 
reliable ways of doing this is to foreground those recipients of aid that exemplify that 
residual and unthreatening humanity in western thought, archetypally, the sick, the old 
and ‘womenandchildren’. 
Then a close-up of a baby – a tiny body, but a 
large head, and its mouth open wide in a silent 
cry. It is held close to its mother’s face. She 
shields it with a cloth that drapes them both, 
drawing it to her and looks down. The infant’s 
silent anguish, eyes closed, mouth wide, 
screaming, continues -. Finally the mother tries to 
nurse it. (Edkins 2000, 107-8) 
As Edkins points out in her discussion of the coverage of the Ethiopian famine in 1984-5, 
even at the time there were many protests at the construction of the Ethiopians as pure 
‘vicitms’ and the west as pure ‘rescuers’. Since then, the academic debate surrounding 
emergency aid has increasingly sought to disrupt this simple binary, and practices and 
policies surrounding emergency aid have become increasingly sensitive to the political 
complexities of the contexts of such aid operations, and to the ways in which aid itself may 
contribute to creating and sustaining situations of emergency need (Edkins 2000, 129-152; 
Barnett and Weiss 2008). However, as Edkins also points out, even as experts and 
technocrats challenge the idea that you can treat famine as a ‘natural’ disaster, if they are to 
preserve the meaning of humanitarian aid then they have to reinvent the humanitarian 
relation, in which the helper is defined by their capacity, and the helped by their incapacity, 
to address the sources of suffering.  
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The politics of rescue needs ways of cutting through the complexity and ambiguity of 
actual humanitarian crisis in order to establish distinctions between the innocent and guilty, 
victims and heroes. We can see this, as much as anything, in the reluctance of publics to 
accept that humanitarian workers themselves might need to be paid or to have their work in 
the field supported by bureaucracies. Organizations such as Oxfam are only able to retain 
their moral authority by affirming their actions are uncontaminated by interests, and that they 
have the knowledge and capacity to identify and rectify humanitarian wrongs. All of this is 
rendered plausible through gendered discriminations between rescuer and victim, autonomy 
and vulnerability, control and chaos. In the following section, I examine how the 
discriminations of the human that are embedded in the ethics of humanitarianism become 
intensified when humanitarianism turns to violence, where the discourse of a politics of 
rescue meets the discourse of just war. 
 
Military Humanitarianism 
Humanitarianism originated as a response to the sufferings of those affected by war (often 
dated back to the founding of the Red Cross in 1863). The idea of military 
humanitarianism, although arguably foreshadowed in imperial ‘civilisational’ interventions 
in the nineteenth century, has only recently been recognised as a potentially legitimate, or 
even required, policy option for states and the international community. It brings together 
practices that have traditionally been seen as distinct into a new, hybrid practice that is both 
humanitarian and war. There are of course those who would deny the existence of 
‘humanitarian intervention’ as an actual phenomenon – regarding the discourse of 
humanitarianism rather as an ideological disguise for the pursuit of straightforward national 
or sectional, elite interests. Within this chapter, however, I treat humanitarian intervention 
on its own terms as being, at least in part, about the pursuit of justice.  
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My interest is in the relation between the moral script of humanitarianism and the 
moral script of ‘just war’ into which, as a practice of war, military humanitarianism is 
inserted both by its proponents and opponents. Since scholars started to pay attention to the 
theory and practice of military humanitarian intervention in the 1990s, many commentators 
have pointed to its gendered dimensions, from the discourses through which it is described 
and legitimated, to the ways in which it should be carried out, to the nature of its aims, to 
its short and long term effects (Cockburn & Zarkov 2002, Sjoberg 2006). 
The idea that just war thinking is a heavily gendered script is now well established 
in feminist and non-feminist scholarship. The classic statement of this gendering can be 
found in Elshtain’s Women and War (1987), which demonstrated in detail how the 
discourses through which war has been legitimated in western culture are premised on the 
division between ‘just warrior’ and ‘beautiful soul’, chivalrous protector and vulnerable 
victim, regardless of the actual roles played by men and women in collective violence. The 
just warrior/ beautiful soul duality is constituted and maintained as mutually reinforcing 
through its inter-relation with another gendered distinction between just (civilized – 
controlled masculinity) and unjust (barbarian – hyper-masculinity) warriors, the latter 
providing the requisite threat from which the beautiful souls must be protected. Scholars, 
such as Kinsella (2004), have shown how in the refinement and institutionalisation of 
Christian just war principles in Europe from the seventeenth century onwards, the 
distinction between legitimate and non-legitimate targets in war, traditionally that between 
the ‘innocent’ and the ‘guilty’ was stabilised by using sex/ gender as a marker. Whilst the 
borders between innocent and guilty, child and adult or sick and well were shifting, 
uncertain, not always easily observable, the boundary between male and female was 
presented as static and obvious. Some clear demarcation was necessary to sustain the 
distinction between Christian and barbarian warfare, and that between male and female 
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bodies became exemplary. In twentieth century efforts to codify and reinforce the 
distinction between combatant and non-combatant, fighter and civilian, again the 
distinction between male and female bodies became crucial to ‘in bello’ justice. To the 
extent, as Carpenter argues (Carpenter 2003); that the idea of a male civilian has become a 
kind of blind spot in both military and humanitarian thinking.  
If we take the main principles of just war: legitimate authority; just cause; 
proportionality ad bellum; proportionality and discrimination in bello, we can trace a 
gendered politics in relation to each in which the just warrior, his barbarian other and the 
beautiful soul play their appointed parts. However, in humanitarian intervention these 
archetypes become particularly clear, because of a mutual reinforcement between the two 
discourses. The moral requirement to rescue is now compounded by the fact that someone 
is actively trying to push the child into the puddle. Both the vulnerability of the victim and 
the requirements on the rescuer are amplified by the addition of an evil perpetrator to the 
plot, which has been referred to as the ‘fairy story’ implicit in military humanitarianism 
(Belloni 2007).  
In his work on humanitarian intervention, Wheeler boils down the relevant just war 
criteria to just cause (supreme humanitarian emergency), last resort (necessity), 
proportionality (means should be proportional to ends) and probability of success (positive 
humanitarian outcome) (Wheeler 2000). This slimmed down version of just war theory, 
involves dropping those categories from traditional just war theory, such as ‘legitimate 
authority’, ‘just intention’ or ‘comparative justice’, through which the gendered plot of just 
war might be disturbed. ‘Legitimate authority’ is problematic because, under current 
international law, there can be just warriors that behave illegitimately (make illegal 
interventions), and barbarian actors that are legitimate (oppressive states) – thus blurring 
the gendered lines of, for instance, the distinction between the state as the legitimate user of 
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controlled violence (over which it has a monopoly) as opposed to the terrorist organization, 
the illegitimate user of uncontrolled violence (to which it has no right). ‘Just intention’ is a 
problem, because the idea of mixed motivations undermines the clarity of the ‘just warrior’ 
category – how could he be just if he was also acting to increase his own power as a 
barbarian warrior would? ‘Comparative justice’, traditionally calls upon parties to war to be 
aware of the fact that there can be right on both sides, or at least that, not being God, 
neither side can guarantee the certainty of their own justice. But this is the most 
problematic criterion (guideline) of all for the purposes of humanitarian intervention, since 
the just cause is premised on a certainty of injustice, in which it could not be possible for 
both sides to be just warriors, or even to think of themselves in those terms.  
I would suggest, therefore, that in humanitarian intervention we get a kind of 
distillation of the gendered just war plot, stripped of possible ambiguities, and reliant on 
simple assumptions about the moral authority and moral agency of the just warrior and the 
innocence and incapacity of the ‘beautiful soul’, which in turn set up what it means to act 
morally in the face of injustice, the villainous third party. As with the representation of the 
Ethiopian Famine referred to earlier, no one could ever take this as an accurate account of 
the complex politics of any humanitarian emergency, which raises the question of why the 
plot remains ethically convincing. Clearly one reason is that as with the earlier example, 
the account of moral authority and agency involved here is sustained by gendered binaries 
that enable clear cut distinctions between reason and emotion, autonomy and vulnerability, 
control and anarchy, rescuer and victim. 
The moral authority of the humanitarian just warrior relies on the same kinds of 
moral self-certainty that Singer articulates in his account of the ethics of famine relief in 
terms of knowledge of the natures of, and relation between, rescuer and victim, and in 
terms of confidence in his own capacity and technical competence. This moral self-
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certainty necessarily requires that not all humans share either the knowledge, the capacities 
or the goodness of the just warrior. As a moral actor, he is rational, autonomous and self-
disciplining. This rationality and autonomy underpin a capacity for heroic action, in which 
he stands up for the right in the face of others’ evil or indifference (‘here I stand I can do no 
other’). Within this account of moral authority and agency, moral humility and emotion are 
marginalized, in part through the disconnection between the just warrior and the differently 
human. Those uncertain of what to do or incapable of action by definition cannot be just 
warriors. And it is only because not everyone is human in the same way that the just 
warrior is able to be a humanitarian, and discriminate between the inhuman (perpetrator) 
and the residually human (victim). The same qualities of rationality and autonomy that 
ground moral authority, also underpin moral agency as the capacity to act, for moral 
purposes, in a way that instantiates the good in the world through controlled and 
controllable means. Although Singer’s moral actor does not engage in violence, he does 
presume the reliability and neutrality of the techniques through which suffering should be 
addressed, and this presumption is bound up with the moral actor as both knowledgeable 
and in control. The just war theory script introduces humanitarianism to violence as a 
technique, but the conviction of the capacity of the moral agent to direct and control the 
means and outcomes of action is already entrenched in the humanitarian script, even in the 
face of the mass of evidence of the failure of violence to deliver its aims. Moreover, the 
humanitarian hero remains himself unaffected by the violence he employs, the practice and 




Feminists Touching War 
One of the most significant dimensions of feminist ethical and political thought 
over the past thirty years has been its challenging of the conception of moral authority and 
agency embedded in the script of humanitarian ethics. Most notably in the ethics of care, 
feminist moral philosophers have disrupted the discriminations that underpin the fiction of 
the rational and autonomous moral agent, not solely because of the gendered politics that 
this fiction is sustained by and reproduces but also because, feminists argue, it 
misrepresents the conditions of possibility of moral authority, agency and action (Robinson 
1999, Sjoberg 2006, Held 2006). A feminist account of moral agency premised, in Bar 
On’s words, on ‘attentiveness to life as it is lived and experienced’ (Bar On, 2008a: x), 
problematises the humanitarian script because it undermines the clarity of the distinction 
between the fully and the residually human. The discriminations that enable Singer’s 
humanitarian actor and the just warrior in military humanitarian intervention to act rightly 
cannot be maintained if the difference and separation between them and the victim and 
perpetrator does not stand up to scrutiny. This not only muddies the waters of the rescuer/ 
victim and rescuer/ perpetrator distinctions, but also the distinction between the means and 
outcomes of action, given that the latter is only sustained by the myth of autonomy that full 
humanity requires. 
Humanitarian arguments provided a distinct strand of justification for both of the 
US led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases the enemy regime was presented not 
only as a threat to others but also as an oppressor of its own population, in the case of 
Afghanistan in particular the population of women. Feminist responses to 9/11 and its 
aftermath, although predominantly critical, demonstrated how the question of the 
legitimacy of violence is contested within feminism (Alloo et al 2002; Bar On et al 2003; 
Hutchings 2007; Bar On 2008a).  From a feminist point of view, the imbrication of 
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humanitarian war making in the reproduction of gendered hierarchies and dangerously 
hubristic accounts of moral authority and agency undermines claims to ethical legitimacy 
(Ruddick 1990; Sjoberg 2006). Feminists have argued that the practice of humanitarian 
violence requires an ethical orientation in tension with humanitarian goals, which give 
priority to the relief of suffering. In order to kill and injure, not only do soldiers (whether 
men or women) have to identify their enemy as killable, they have also to sustain a vision 
of their own just violence through gendered discriminations that reproduce and reinforce 
gendered relations of power. And the experience of violence, of both perpetrators and 
victims, is deeply transformative of the moral agent, leaving legacies of trauma and 
disconnection that persist, and potentially corrupt the heroism of the hero and the 
humanitarian outcome at which military action is directed (Alloo et al 2002; Poe 2008). In 
spite of this, however, feminists returning to re-think the ethics of humanitarian war have 
not all come to a pacifist conclusion. 
 Elshtain is sometimes referred to as a ‘conservative’ feminist and her position has 
been highly contentious within the feminist community (see Sjoberg 2006). Nevertheless, 
her theoretical work has both shaped and been influenced by feminist ethical thinking about 
moral authority and agency. In her book Just War Against Terror (2004) Elshtain argues in 
favour of the invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11. In the book one of the threads at work is a 
humanitarian one, in which military action is, in part, justified by the good it will deliver 
not just to the ‘west’ but also to the people, women in particular, of Afghanistan. As the 
author of Women and War (1987) in which the gendered discriminations enabling war were 
deconstructed, Elshtain is clearly well aware of the gendered script of war. From a feminist 
point of view, therefore, her position post 9/11 seems to contradict her previous arguments. 
On examination, however, Elshtain’s justification of military humanitarianism turns out to 
be closer to the insights of feminist critiques of humanitarian war than is initially obvious. 
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For Elshtain it is those who assume that we can eradicate war from the arena of 
international politics that are premising their arguments on a humanitarian fairy tale. In an 
exchange with Anthony Burke, who had criticised her argument in Just War On Terror as a 
justification of imperialist violence, Elshtain responds that whereas Burke lives in a world 
of moral clarity, based on clear binaries between good and bad, war and peace, her 
argument embraces moral ambiguity (2005: 95; Burke 2005). In effect, Elshtain is turning 
the feminist critique against the humanitarian moral script and its implications for moral 
authority and agency against what she calls the ‘new utopianism’ of humanitarian critics of 
post 9/11 US and NATO violence. In order to do this, she relies on a turn back to some of 
the aspects of traditional just war theory that disturb the straightforward binaries of 
humanitarianism. In contrast to the simplified version of just war theory put forward by 
those seeking to identify clear criteria of justification for humanitarian uses of force 
(Wheeler 2000), Elshtain argues for a revival of an older version of just war theory, in 
which moral ambiguities are assumed to be ineradicable. For Elshtain, just war theory 
provides a resource for practical reasoning in a world in which the actualities of political 
violence and injustice present us with ‘hard’ choices (Elshtain 2005: 92). From this 
standpoint feminist pacifism and versions of liberalism that envisage a world of perpetual 
peace (Burke) are equally guilty of a refusal to touch the murky world of political conflict. 
Elshtain invokes a classical (Augustinian) realist sensibility as the most appropriate 
frame within which to reason morally about collective violence for humanitarian ends in 
contexts of complexity and moral ambiguity. In contrast, Sjoberg’s work takes a very 
different feminist turn, though equally one in which the justification of political violence is 
not automatically ruled out on feminist grounds. For Sjoberg, who is deeply critical of 
Elshtain’s post 9/11 arguments, the appropriate feminist response to the ethical issues 
raised by war, including humanitarian war, is to articulate a distinctively feminist just war 
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theory (Sjoberg 2006: 165-180). In Gender, Justice and the Wars in Iraq (2006), she sets 
out a systematic re-writing of just war principles from a feminist perspective, using the Iraq 
wars from 1990 onwards as an illustration.  
I argue that, through empathy, care, and dialogue, 
feminisms can revise, rewrite, and revitalize the just 
war tradition to deal with the political conflicts of the 
twenty-first century -. (Sjoberg 2006: 15) 
Sjoberg’s ‘feminist security ethic of empathetic cooperation’ builds on aspects of the 
feminist ethic of care and claims to avoid the distorting detachment provided by fairy tale 
accounts of just war, including humanitarian intervention. One of Sjoberg’s key arguments 
is to introduce the notion of ‘human security’ into just war theory (2006: 51). By doing this 
she makes the individual’s experience of threat and harm central to the meaning of war. 
This draws attention to ways in which war is experienced, by people on the ground before 
and after the conflict’s supposed beginning and end, it also draws attention to injuries and 
harms that may not be the direct result of violence means. As Sjoberg points out, in 
criticising assumptions about non-combatant immunity: “The humanitarian impacts of war 
are so far reaching that it is not possible to be immune to them” (2006: 101). This undercuts 
the gendered discriminations that underpin justifications of humanitarian war as the 
protection of the innocent from harm.  
 Although Sjoberg argues that her feminist security ethic provides grounds for the 
moral condemnation of the recent US led wars in Iraq, it does not condemn war as such. 
Rather it attempts to formulate principles that provide a way into thinking about the ethical 
legitimation of war that are fundamentally in touch with the gendered experience of what 
war is and does. In spite of their bitter political opposition, therefore, there are 
commonalities between the positions of Elshtain and Sjoberg. In both cases they claim a 
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greater ‘realism’ about the actualities of political violence than can be found in either 
feminist pacifism or gendered humanitarian ethics. I suggest, however, that in spite of their 
best efforts to ‘touch’ war, neither of them fully succeeds in escaping from the 
humanitarian fairy tale.  
In Elshtain’s case, a revealing aspect of her exchange with Burke focuses on her 
identification with a particular superhero. Burke points to Elshtain’s use of the idea of a 
‘Spider-Man’ ethic, in which superpowers are understood to carry and be obliged to 
respond to wrongs in any part of the world. Elshtain corrects Burke’s understanding of the 
use of this analogy on the grounds that unlike Superman, Spider-Man is a deeply conflicted 
super hero, who is tormented by ‘tragic’ choices every step of the way. In place of the 
straightforward hero of humanitarian intervention, Elshtain argues that powers engaging in 
humanitarian intervention are flawed and compromised: “What a pity that Burke has not 
familarized himself with this existential and troubled hero!” (Elshtain 2005: 93) On 
reflection, however, even though Elshtain’s vision of the humanitarian hero may be more 
nuanced than the identity of ‘Superman’, her position still mirrors standard aspects of the 
humanitarian fairy tale. In particular, this is because of the way in which we are still 
presented with a three-fold world of hero, victim and villain. Spider-Man may be a flawed 
and tormented character, but it is still in him that the capacity for both action and moral 
agency resides. He is also, of course, still a man. The script remains one that is thoroughly 
gendered and is difficult to render plausible in the absence of gendered discriminations that 
simplify and disambiguate the world of political violence. 
Sjoberg goes much further than Elshtain in putting the role of ‘victim’ under 
scrutiny. Her revised criteria for just war theory engage in detail with the actualities of the 
experience of war, and directly challenge the clarity of distinctions on which Elshtain 
relies, for instance in relation to the principle of non-combatant immunity. In Sjoberg’s 
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case, however, it is difficult to see how the highly demanding criteria she sets out for just 
war could actually be met in a world in which political violence remains part of the 
repertoire of political action. A just war theory based on a feminist security ethic of 
empathetic cooperation would appear to require a world in which the gendered 
discriminations that underpin the legitimation of war were no longer being made. In this 
respect, Sjoberg does end up sharing a lot of ground with feminist pacifism, and from 
Elshtain’s point of view embraces the fairy tale of a political violence without remainder. 
The fairy tale that is crucial to legitimations of military humanitarianism in the first place. 
 
Conclusion 
Feminist critiques of the ‘human’ in humanitarian suggest that it is multiply illusory. 
There is no universal humanity in either the residual or the maximal versions of the 
human that are built into it, not just because the two categories of human are mutually 
exclusive, but more significantly because they are both politically loaded, gendered 
fictions. But if this is so, where does this leave us in practice? When it comes of military 
humanitarianism, the examples of Elshtain and Sjoberg, in different ways, suggest that 
attempts to re-write humanitarian scripts without reference to these gendered fictions are 
fraught with difficulty. This raises the question of whether in seeking to touch war as a 
practice and experience, feminists necessarily return to a choice between realism, 
however ‘tragic’, on the one hand, and pacifism (in practice if not in theory) on the other. 
As Bar On notes, this is a troubling conclusion in a world in which violence is embedded 
and feminists cannot but desire ‘a normative differentiation of violence into kinds’ (Bar 
On 2008b: 149). The question is whether it is possible to develop our ethical and political 
imaginations in such a way that the discriminate violence played out in the humanitarian 
script does not depend on gendered fictions of moral authority and agency, and does not 
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work so as to reproduce a world in which political violence is the default mode of 
political struggle.    
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